Introduction: More than Meets the Eye
Talks about the importance of solidarity within the refugee law regime are not new.
The international protection system is predicated on international cooperation and discussions about 'burden sharing' have been common in the recent past.
1 The preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention (CSR51) contains precisely a reference to the need for 'international co-operation' for a 'satisfactory solution' to be found to situations of forced displacement, 'considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries'.
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Perspectives on the principle, however, vary, with stark differences between countries along the 'North-South' axis. While Western countries generally embrace the 'Safe Third Country' (STC) notion, 3 maintaining that earlier presence in the territory of a State, through passage or stay, engages legal responsibility to determine status and provide protection, 4 developing countries emphasize the negative impact of such a rule, highlighting its 'burden shifting' rather than 'burden sharing' effect.
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Very tellingly, prior to the conclusion of the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016, 6 Turkey persistently opposed STC transfers, underlining the unfair result to which they lead, regionalizing protection and concentrating responsibility on transit countries that happen (by geographical chance) to be closer to refugee-producing States. 7 Imbalances and disagreement on how to allocate international protection duties have not been overcome over the years. Discussions on the 'irregular secondary movements' strand of the Convention Plus initiative, launched in 2002 by UNHCR, have yielded no results, 8 and calls for a 'New Deal' on burden sharing, nearly ten years later, have yet to materialize. 9 The debate has regained momentum during the 'refugee crisis' and, particularly, after the 2016 New York Summit, 'acknowledg [ing] a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner'. 10 Such 'shared responsibility' is considered essential to demonstrating 'solidarity with, and support for, the millions of people […] who, for reasons beyond their control, are forced to uproot themselves[…]'.
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In response, the UNHCR Executive Committee programme (EXCOM) has 'reaffirmed' its 'commitment to international solidarity and responsibility-and burden-sharing involving all members of the international community' and has engaged itself 'to further strengthening international cooperation and solidarity and equitable responsibility and burden sharing ' . 12 Yet, a codified 'solidarity obligation'
at the universal level is still lacking, 13 which diminishes the legal strength of the principle and its practical traction as an ordering standard to apportion responsibility for 'durable solutions' on the global scale.
Nonetheless, this contribution argues that there is more than meets the eye, especially within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), upon the 
The Normative Foundations of EU Solidarity
The idea of solidarity as an ordering principle of legal relations has a long pedigree.
In the civil law system of post-revolutionary France, the notion was linked with the republican ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité, which found articulation in the States in the performance of their respective obligations and compels them, 'in full mutual respect', to take active steps and/or refrain from noxious conduct that may 'jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives'. 67 In a way, Article 4(3) TEU represents the 'systemic' facet of solidarity that reflects the mutuality and reciprocal dependence of the Union and the Member States in the realisation of EU integration. 68 But, solidarity (not only as principle but as cross-cutting EU value) is arguably broader and more fundamental. 69 As part of Article 2 TEU, it provides both the starting place and final goal to 'the whole of the Community system'. 70 Unlike loyalty, it gives rise to (autonomous) obligations, demanding positive action of a special (solidarity-prone) kind that translates it into operational policy. 71 the 'corrective' approach proposed by the Commission. 92 The political elevation of Dublin as the 'cornerstone' of the CEAS, 93 above the exigencies of primary norms, contravenes the most basic tenets on the hierarchy of sources of EU law-especially in the post-Lisbon context of positivized solidarity. 94 The 'first country of entry' rule, following which asylum claims are to be allocated to the Member State most responsible for the presence of the refugee in the EU (as if geographical fortuity could be determined or controlled), shifts, rather than shares, responsibility. It has no basis in the Refugee Convention-its blame-based rationale may even contravene the principle of non-penalisation for irregular entry enshrined in Article 31- 95 and its logic disfavours distributive justice. In the optic of Article 80 TFEU, it is both inappropriate and unnecessary. It transgresses the level of discretion allowed in the choice of means to realize the explicit objectives of solidarity and responsibility sharing.
A 're-balancing' approach such as that put forward in the Dublin IV Proposal would be justified, if the initial allocation were even (yet imperfect) or, at least, not manifestly unfair. 96 But, in so far as responsibility criteria (by design) overburden certain Member States, rendering them unable to cater for the rights of protection seekers, as the Commission avows, 97 the system should be adjudged unconstitutional. 98 Instead, what Article 80 TFEU requires is a regime of collective and concerted responsibility that capacitates achievement of the CEAS' aims. 99 Reactive, compensatory solidarity is therefore not enough. 100 Article 80 TFEU calls for a proactive, structural solidarity-based arrangement that optimizes the CEAS'
effectiveness. 101 Solidarity therein should be apprehended as a tripartite institutional, procedural, and material duty of shared responsibility that is ab initio fair. peoples'. 112 The justification, borrowing from the Schuman Declaration, is possibly to 'build concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity', 113 as a prelude to the emergence of a (transnational) European community that 'feels' like one.
Similarly to the financial costs related to the reception of asylum seekers, solidarity hereby involves the sharing of resources with the less endowed (who may not be able to immediately reciprocate) in the quest for 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' 114 (or the constitution of a CEAS in line with fundamental rights, as in the GISTI case). This is how the institutional and material elements of solidarity intertwine, through a duty of loyal contribution to a shared, fair result.
Alongside the vertical facet, the systemic dimension of fairness inscribed in the principle of solidarity has also been considered by the CJEU. Systemic fairnessit is submitted-necessitates both of individual and collective allegiance to the CEAS (and the Union) as a whole, so the common policy operates effectively and achieves the desired outcome. This is, at least, the understanding espoused in other areas of EU law. For example, solidarity has been relied upon (if tacitly) to guarantee the good functioning of the single market by regulating the overproduction of steel, even at the expense of individual producers, to safeguard the sector as such. 115 The same philosophy has been employed to justify sugar, milk or wine quotas within the Common Agricultural Policy, 'to provide a degree of control over production whilst re-orientating it towards the needs of the market'. 116 Arguments regarding specific (or even discriminatory) impact on one or the other producer have normally been rejected in the name of the higher (common) interests of the system as a whole; that, even with regard to producers or entire countries playing no part in the surplus, 117 or even requiring extra supply to cover a (domestic) production deficit. 118 Solidaristic efforts by all players (for the benefit of the system itself) have been deemed key in these cases (rejecting any blame-based reasoning à la Dublin).
Finally, the horizontal aspect of solidarity has (implicitly) been mobilized too.
In relation to the economic crisis, and the no-bailout clause in Article 125 TFEU, the Pringle judgment illustrates the point. Therein, the Court concluded to the nonviolation of the prohibition via a (solidarity-enhancing) narrow construction, so that EU targeted financial/technical assistance provided for the promotion of sound budgetary polices at domestic level was interpreted to be allowed-with only complete or straightforward bailouts forbidden. Without mentioning solidarity, the principle was nonetheless at work to protect the weakest performers within the European stability scheme to thereby preserve the Eurozone as a whole-the horizontal facet of solidarity being put at the service of the systemic dimension thereof to guarantee the attainment of the higher EU public interest goals. 119 Such contextual, multi-polar/multi-functional configuration of (horizontal, vertical, and systemic) solidarity, entailing institutional, material, and procedural facets, is conceivably the same that is inscribed in Article 80 TFEU.
The External Dimension: Solidarity as Organising Principle of EU External Relations
It has been posited that solidarity within the EU and solidarity with the rest of the globe cannot possibly mean the same; that intra-EU solidarity 'distinguishes the EU and its members from other parts of the world and international organisations'.
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From the federalising perspective of the 'ever closer Union' envisaged by the Treaties, 121 taking solidarity as an end in itself, representing a special commitment to the constitution of a community of Member States and EU citizens, this may well be the case. Yet, as discussed above, solidarity has multiple dimensions and its value as an organising principle of EU external relations has been explicitly recognised in
Lisbon provisions.
As a result, the largely absent 'solidarity obligation' at international (refugee) law indicated at the outset is palliated by the EU-grown requirement of solidarity, which applies not only internally (by virtue of Article 80 TFEU), but also externally according to which the EU 'shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies', to guarantee the 'effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions', supports this conclusion. 131 From a substantive perspective, solidarity as a-means-to-an-end within the CEAS remains subject to the delivery of 'fairness' to TCNs already noted, which includes, at minimum, respect for their fundamental rights. 132 The fundamental rights of asylum seekers and refugees that the EU legal order recognises constitute the common framework of primary law norms shared across the internal-external continuum of the CEAS that the vertical facet of solidarity encapsulates. 133 The fact that those in need of protection are non-citizens, coming from abroad, does nothing to diminish the legal strength of commitments in their regard. Post-Lisbon, the Charter 'shall have the same legal value as the Treaties'. 134 In fact, it 'reaffirms…the rights as 
The EU-Turkey Deal: Example of External Non-solidarity
The horizontal dimension of EU external solidarity may be the least straightforward, if communitarian/federalising conceptions of the principle provide the starting place of analysis. However, when the overarching interests of the system of international protection are taken as reference point instead, it becomes clear that 'the CEAS must Europe. 151 The presumption is that Turkey is a STC for returns from Greece, despite it maintaining a geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention, and regardless of its widely documented mistreatment of refugees. 152 Whether the 'deal' constitutes a 'fair' distribution of asylum responsibilities between the EU and Turkey, especially considering that Turkey already hosts 3 million Syrian refugees, 153 depends on how fairness is assessed. On a material understanding of fairness, those sharing duties should do so according to an equitable scheme, considering the total onus to apportion. 154 But, on a procedural reading, fairness would depend on the process through which a 'deal' is negotiated. Provided that the decision-making plan allows all parties to have an equal say in the debate, and an equal chance to influence the end result, the final outcome should be considered 'fair'. 155 Since both Turkey and the EU Member States had similar veto capacities, means-to-an-end in the construction of a CEAS 'with due respect for the rules' of the ('mother') global protection system deriving from international refugee law. 162 The main objective of the article was, thus, to unpack the difference between mere 'international cooperation' and 'solidarity', both explicitly mentioned in the EU Treaties as guiding principles of the external dimension of the CEAS, 163 This exercise should have direct consequences in the area of asylum policy, feeding into current debates on the 'third phase' of the instruments concerned. 165 It should point to the need for an overhaul of the Dublin rationale and the related selfserving approach currently guiding CEAS external action-resting on STC rules, aleatory geographical proximity to refugee flows, and non-access to asylum in the EU. But, more widely, the above will hopefully also contribute to the normative conceptualization of solidarity and its operationalization as a (meta-)principle of EU law with general reach and (coherent) application across policy fields.
